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Why Leaders Fight, by Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, Cali M. Ellis

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The history of political events is made by people. It doesn't exist without us. From wars to elections to political protests, the choices we make, our actions, how we behave, dictate events. Not all individuals have the same impact on our world and our lives. Some peoples' choices alter the pathways that history takes. In particular, national chief executives play a large role in forging the destinies of the countries they lead. Why Leaders Fight is about those world leaders and how their beliefs, world views, and tolerance for risk and military conflict are shaped by their life experiences before they enter office - military, family, occupation, and more. Using in-depth research on important leaders and the largest set of data on leader backgrounds ever gathered, the authors of Why Leaders Fight show that - within the constraints of domestic political institutions and the international system - who ends up in office plays a critical role in determining when and why countries go to war.
- Sales Rank: #846899 in Books
- Published on: 2015-09-29
- Released on: 2016-01-21
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.98" h x .47" w x 5.98" l, .0 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 228 pages
Review
"The authors deftly dissect a notoriously difficult problem at the intersection of political science, history and psychology: when do attributes of leaders shape decisions to use force? And they make a compelling case that, naysayers notwithstanding, personality matters."
Philip E. Tetlock, Annenberg University Professor, University of Pennsylvania
"Why Leaders Fight restores the role of leaders to its rightful place in explaining the factors lead to international conflict. By integrating insights from history with the tools of modern social science and international relations theory, the authors offer a more comprehensive and nuanced framework for understanding what causes nations to go to war - insights that will be valued by policymakers and scholars alike."
James B. Steinberg, Dean, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University and former US Deputy Secretary of State
"Scholars have struggled to study systematically what policymakers have long understood intuitively: that individuals matter in foreign policy. This landmark study bridges that gap, arguing that the life-experience leaders bring into office shape their behavior in predictable ways. The debates this book will generate will advance the field considerably and be fodder for conversations in the seminar room and the corridors of power."
Peter Feaver, Duke University, North Carolina
"With brand new data and innovative methods illuminated by compelling narratives of leaders in action, Why Leaders Fight helps transform the truism 'leadership matters' from slogan to science. When all the external and internal pressures are reckoned, there is still room for choice in the great matters of international politics. Horowitz, Stam and Ellis show how the life experiences of the individuals who make those choices appear to influence their judgment in systematic and consequential ways. Future scholars may well look back to this book as the beginning of the end of the idea that a social science of international politics could safely set aside the individual level of analysis."
William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College
About the Author
Michael C. Horowitz is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of the award-winning book, The Diffusion of Military Power. He has published widely in academic journals and mainstream media outlets on topics including the role of leaders in international politics, military innovation and the future of war, and forecasting. Professor Horowitz has worked at the Department of Defense, is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He received a PhD in Government from Harvard University and a BA in Political Science from Emory University, Atlanta.
Allan C. Stam is Dean of Leadership and Public Policy at the Frank Batten School at the University of Virginia. His work on war outcomes, durations, and mediation has appeared in numerous political science journals. Several grants have supported his work, including four from the National Science Foundation. His books include Win, Lose, or Draw (1996), Democracies at War (2002), and The Behavioral Origins of War (2004). He is the recipient of the 2004 Karl Deutsch award, given annually by the International Studies Association to the scholar under the age of forty who has made the greatest contribution to the study of international politics.
Cali M. Ellis previously worked at the RAND Corporation, the Homeland Security Directorate of the Michigan National Guard, and the Michigan Governor's Office. She is a member of the Edward A. Bouchet Graduate Honor Society, and her awards include the National Science Foundation IDEAS-IGERT Graduate Fellowship, the APSA Janet Box-Steffensmeier Award, the ProQuest Dissertation Writing Award, and a Distinguished Service Medal from the Michigan National Guard. Ellis has a BA in economics from Bates College, Maine and an MPP from the University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, and has published in International Interactions (2015), the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (2013), PS: Political Science and Politics (2012), and the Journal of Applied Security Research (2008).
Most helpful customer reviews
2 of 4 people found the following review helpful.
Four Stars
By Jefferson Heath
This relies on historical data, which is subjective in nature. But with that limitation, an interesting read.
1 of 9 people found the following review helpful.
Do Individual Politicians Matter?
By David Swanson
It is entirely possible that President Al Gore would not have attacked Afghanistan or Iraq. President Henry Wallace might very well not have nuked Hiroshima or Nagasaki. President William Jennings Bryan almost certainly would not have attacked the Philippines.
Presidents are pushed into war and held back from war all the time, but they also do some pushing and pulling of their own. Within days of Germany's surrender in World War II, Winston Churchill proposed recruiting German troops into a new UK/US war on the Soviet Union. The idea went nowhere with his own government or allies, except to become the Cold War. But every crazed idea he'd had for years prior to that moment had been deemed acceptable and acted upon, and someone else might not have had the same ideas.
Do the sorts of powerful insiders epitomized by the Council on Foreign Relations usually get their way? Is the United States an oligarchy? Are small differences between electoral candidates magnified and exaggerated? Do both major political parties in the United States back essentially the same sort of militarism? Does a quasi-permanent shadow government within the Pentagon, CIA, State Department, etc., sometimes circumvent and overrule presidents? Yes, of course, all of those things are true. But individuals also matter.
They would matter less in a democracy. If Congress decided on war as the U.S. Constitution requires, or if the public voted on war as the Ludlow Amendment would have required, or if the United States gave up war as the Kellogg-Briand Pact mandates, then the militarism in the mind of one individual would not decide the fate of so many lives and deaths. But that's not reality now.
A President Lincoln Chafee or a President Bernie Sanders or a President Jill Stein, rather than a President Hillary Clinton or a President Donald Trump, would be one factor among many weighing to some degree against the likelihood of more and larger and more dangerous wars. Whether the chance and possible benefit of electing a better president is worth diverting resources from other anti-war work into the national circus of election obsession is a separate and much more complex question.
This point, that individuals matter, is made in the new book Why Leaders Fight by Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis. They go up against the academic tradition of attempting to explain war decisions through whatever process can most resemble the physical sciences. That tradition has steered far clear of anything as messy as a human being, preferring to ponder game theory or to hunt for non-existent correlations between war and population density, resource scarcity, or anything else that can be quantified.
Having brought the individual back into consideration, the authors of Why Leaders Fight immediately attempt to make that resemble as closely as possible a mathematical equation. Was this national ruler someone who had been in the military, and was he or she in combat? What was their first experience with war? What is their education level? What is their age? What previous job did they hold? Were they raised by good parents? Were they raised wealthy or poor? What was their birth order? Et cetera.
Will all such data ever allow a calculation to reliably predict war mongering or peacefulness? Of course not. Will examinations of enough past leaders along these lines open our eyes to some areas for concern or reassurance? Perhaps. But can such scientistic studies reach the level of being a better guide to what a political candidate might do than is an examination of what that candidate has done and said? I doubt it.
A careful reading of candidates' platforms, speeches, and casual remarks, including what is given prominence and what is omitted, and weighed against what they've actually done in the past, takes one quite far. Add in who's funding them, what party they've sworn allegiance to, how they relate to government and media insiders, how they relate to foreign leaders, how they handle mistakes, how they deal with crises, and one can -- I think -- predict fairly accurately which candidate is going to be a minor or major weight against a war that powerful interests demand, and which candidate is going to be easily pushed into war or, in fact, rush to create one at the earliest opportunity. It's not as though George W. Bush and Harry Truman and William McKinley hadn't advertised what sort of things they planned to do.
Academics bent on making the social sciences into real by-god sciences left out more than the individual politician after all. They left out the wider culture. An older politician eager to make his or her mark before their time is up won't create wars in a culture that honors making peace. An official whose childhood and background statistics suggest they will take great risks would have to take none at all to go along with the routine militarism of the current U.S. government, but would challenge the whole military industry and the whole communications industry by attempting nonviolent solutions to crises. Disarmament is considered risky in U.S. culture, making questionable the expectation that risk-taking personalities will promote militarism. In other words, the interpretation and weighting of the data has to change so drastically with the culture that one is better off just looking at the culture.
President Obama would have heavily bombed Syria in 2013 if not for the weight of U.S. culture against it. President John McCain would not have been free to develop a kill list and a drone murder program without the sort of intense public opposition that meets Republicans who do such things. There can be no question that individuals matter, especially large numbers of individuals actively demanding something. Nor can there be any question that one of those individuals who matter is you.
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